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Evaluating the Nordea Experiment: 
Evidence from Market and Accounting Data 
1. Introduction 
 Nordea provides a virtually unique experiment in cross-border banking. Most cross-border 
banks are large relative to the market in their home countries but small relative to their host-
country markets. Further, the degree of integration across home- and host-country operations is 
typically rather small—back office and information operations may be integrated, and the bank 
typically tries to use lessons learned in the home country to improve techniques in its host-
country operations, but seldom more. Many financial institutions have portfolio investments in 
financial institutuions outside their home countries, some have branches in foreign countries 
mainly to provide services there to their major home-country customers, and some have full-
service subsidiaries that are, however, substantially smaller than home country operations. In 
contrast, Nordea’s strategy is to provide a full range of financial services throughout each of the 
Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden—in an integrated organization as if 
the four countries were one. Nordea was built by merger and acquisition of on-going well-
established full-service financial institutions with sizeable market share. Nordea’s strategy is 
built on the assumption that there are economies of scope and scale in financial services that 
cannot be reaped even by a bank that is large relative to any single Nordic market, but can be 
reaped by a bank with large operations in each Nordic country. In the future, other banks may 
adopt the Nordea full-service multiple-country strategy, especially if Nordea’s experiment 
proves successful.   
 There are pro and con arguments about whether Nordea’s strategy is likely to work. On the 
one hand, a big Nordic bank is small relative to big banks in the U.K., Germany, France, the 
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U.S., … Some argue that, ultimately, such Nordic minnows cannot compete against these large-
country whales, because the whales reap economies of scale and scope, and possibly can save on 
taxes by internalizing operations. On the other hand, some argue that individual Nordic countries 
are niches, and niche players can be quite profitable if they are nimble and sophisticated. They 
can outperform any big foreign bank that tries to move in. In this view, the economies of scale 
and scope are much oversold and if they exist they cannot offset the advantages niche-players 
have in their knowledge and skills in their niches. This implies that a Nordicization strategy such 
as Nordea’s is likely to fail—it incurs extra costs in pursuing economies of scale and scope that 
are likely not important and perhaps forfeits nice advantages.  
 Nordea’s experiment raises a host of questions regarding, for example, transnational 
regulation, the source and existence of economies of scope and scale in financial serives and the 
appropriate mix of uniformity across countries for some services versus the use of national 
banking practices in each country for other services. A fundamental question is the economic 
success of Nordea’s experiment. It may well be too early to give a satisfactory evaluation of 
Nordea’s economic success. First, a number of the constituent financial institutions from which 
Nordea was built were in need of improvements when incorporated into Nordea. Second, Nordea 
is an on-going experiment in which previously foreseen problems are still being addressed, for 
example, optimal legal and functional organization. Third, unforeseen problems arise in any 
experiment, and Nordea is still addressing these, for example, problems due to the Nordic 
countries’ different legal and tax systems. Further, an observer must make allowances for factors 
specific to Nordea’s current management team; maybe the team is so good that it can make a bad 
strategy work; or maybe the team is sub-par and unable to make a fine strategy work as it should. 
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Nevertheless, the Nordea experiment is of sufficient interest that it is useful to present 
results of evaluating Nordea’s economic track record thus far. Further, in evaluating Nordea, 
comparables play a large role, and this paper lays out some of the serious difficulties that must be 
faced in using comparables to evaluate Nordea, and future possible cross-border banking 
experiments, and provides possible solutions to the problems encounted below in using 
comparables. 
 The results for Nordea are mixed. Nordea is clearly not an outstanding success relative to a 
variety of benchmarks used here, but Nordea is hardly a failure. Further, Nordea seems to be 
doing relatively better in some countries than in others, adding further complications to the 
picture. Finally, Nordea’s banking activities appear to be substantially more profitable than its 
other activities, though the evidence for Nordea’s profitability in banking must be taken as 
tentative, because it comes from evaluating Nordea banks relative to holding companies of 
competitors. In considering the profitability of Nordea bansk, it should be noted banking is the 
least integrated product area across the four countries, and thus a candidate for earning rents.  
 The main analytical tool is to evaluate Nordea's performance in terms of stock-market rates 
of return and accounting rates of return relative to a group of comparable Nordic financial 
institutions. Use of comparables as a benchmark is common in firm valuation and in event 
studies; indeed, whatever other methods a study might use, a complete study includes results 
from using comparables as a benchmark. In the Nordea case, however, the use of comparables as 
a benchmark is difficult at a minimum and many may view it as highly questionable. This is 
because analysis below shows that the underlying parameters in the Data Generating Process for 
Nordea rates of return shift importantly over time, but the parameters in the DGP for the 
comparables do not shift as much or in the same way. In particular, the required rate of return for 
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the Nordea holding company shifts importantly a number of times over the sample period, but 
the required rate of return for the comparables index shows much less important shifts. Thus, 
substantial variations in Nordea's stock-market performance relative to the comparables may be 
explained in important part by variations in Nordea's required rate of return. This explanation 
still leaves the puzzle, however, of why Nordea's management adopted policies that led to large 
swings in the holding company's required rate of return.                 
Section 2. Data and Data Issues 
The Nordea holding company that exists in 2005 was formed by combining four Nordic 
financial institutions. Nordbanken, a Swedish institution, announced the planned merger with 
Merita, a Finnish institution, on October 12, 1997, and the deal was completed on November 26, 
1997. The combined Norbanken plus Merita (Nordic Baltic Holding Company) announced the 
attempt to acquired Unidanmark, a Danish institution, and the attempt’s success, on the same 
day, March 6, 2000. Finally, the combined bank (MeritaNordbanken) announced its attempt to 
acquire Christiana Bank, a Norwegian institution, on September 24, 1999 (observation 1242) and 
the attempt’s success on October 16, 2000 (observation 1518). 
In evaluating Nordea's performance, two types of comparisons are used. The first is 
financial rates of return from the Nordea holding company versus rates of return (a) from the 
competitors in the Nordic countries and (b) from measures of the world market. The full names 
of the Nordic comparables are listed in Appendix A; all appendices are omitted from this paper 
but are available from the authors. Data from the Nordic competitors allow construction of 
benchmarks against which Nordea can be measured. The Data Appendix (Appendix B) provides 
information on the sources of data for Nordea and its competitors and on the various 
benchmarks; the benchmarks are also discussed in the text below. The second type of 
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comparison is accounting data for Nordea versus a number of competitors from each of the 
Nordic countries. Though Nordea provides accounting data on its banking operations in 
individual countries, its competitors do not break out banking operations; hence, Nordea banks 
are evaluated relative to competitors' holding companies, thus allowing some inferences that are 
more limited and less solid than if data on competitors' banks were available.  
The various Nordea organizations and the financial institutions used as comparables in this 
study are listed in Appendix A; there are 16 comparable financial institutions, six in Denmark, 
four in Finland, three in Norway and three in Sweden. The Appendix B (the Data Appendix) 
discusses how they were selected. The criteria emphasized comparable size and lines of business, 
and aimed at having a minimum of five comparables from each country. In practice, it was 
impossible to find as many comparable as the initial research design called for, and essentially all 
Nordic financial service firms were included in the comparables if they were large enough, had a 
full line of financial services and had an adequate number of time-series observation. Note that 
the Nordea banks and comparable banks cover approximately 95 percent of the banking 
operations in each of the Nordic countries. The exact definitions of the variables and ratios used 
in this paper’s analysis are in Appendix C. As signaled by the differences in Appendix C in 
variable definitions across the Nordic countries, the four countries’ accounting systems differ 
importantly; further, the differences are greater than those Appendix C reveals. Without access to 
internal data, it is impossible to restate the four countries’ banks’ accounting data on the same 
basis. Thus, this paper uses the only data available, in the belief that if the data are treated with 
care and caution, cross-country comparisons can be useful. Note that such data problems are 
general in cross-country bank studies; further, similar problems arise in any cross-country study 
of firms, and is not necessarily worse for banks than for other types of firms.    
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3. Nordea’s Financial-Market Performance  
 This section examines financial markets’ judgement of Nordea’s economic performance. 
The analysis begins by examining Nordea holding company1 rates of return relative to an index 
of comparables. When using accounting data, the subject firm's results are typically examined 
relative to comparables, and this is done below. If the comparables approach is also used to 
evaluate financial performance, the researcher can judge financial and accounting results on the 
same basis; further, in the 1990s it became fairly standard to use comparables for judging 
performance and for examining the financial-market wealth effects of various events. For both 
reasons, this paper initially uses the comparables approach to evaluate Nordea's financial-market 
performanc; Lee (1997) and Lyons et al. (1999) discuss the use of comparable firms in 
evaluating performance. 
Nordea's Performance Relative to Comparables. This section begins by comparing the 
log of the relative wealth index of Nordea, measured in Danish kronor, to an equally-weighted 
average of the log of the relative wealth indices of 11 comparables2, also measured in Danish 
kronor; note that abnormal returns are independent of the currency in which the returns are 
calculated, and this is so whether the benchmark is comparables’ rates of return or market rates 
of return.3 Of the 16 comparables available for this study, only 11 have price and dividend data 
available that allow them to be used as comparables for Nordea rates of return.   
                                                 
1 The Nordea parent company went by a variety of names over time; the evolution of the company and its names are 
discussed below.  
2 This approach means that the first difference of the the comparables index is an equally weighted average of the 
eleven log rates of return. An alternative is to take the log of the average of the relative wealth indices of the 11 
countries; the first diffenece of this log index is not an equally weighted average of the log rates of return of the 
eleven comparables.  
3 This can be seen by supposing that it is desired to convert the rates of return to another currency, say the U.S. 
dollar. Each rate of return [1 + (Pj,t + Divj,t - Pj,t-1) / Pj,t-1] can be divided by (1 + ∆St / St-1) where St is the number of 
DKK per USD, to give [1 + (Pj,t + Divj,t - Pj,t-1) / Pj,t-1] / (1 + ∆St / St-1). The natural log is ln[1 + (Pj,t + Divj,t - Pj,t-1) / 
Pj,t-1] - ln(1 + ∆St / St-1). If abnormal returns in USD are formed, the abnormal return is ln[1 + (Pj,t + Divj,t - Pj,t-1) / 
Pj,t-1] - ln(1 + ∆St / St-1) - {∆lnRWIC,t - ln(1 + ∆St / St-1)} = ln[1 + (Pj,t + Divj,t - Pj,t-1) / Pj,t-1] - ∆lnRWIC,t.  
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 A relative wealth index supposes that one krone is invested at the start of the period in a 
given asset, and shows how the value of this krone changes over time, due to price appreciation 
and dividend payments. The relative wealth index for asset j at time t is  
 RWIj,t = [1 + (Pj,1 + Divj,1 - Pj,0) / Pj,0] [1 + (Pj,2 + Divj,2 - Pj,1) / Pj,1]  
… [1 + (Pj,T + Divj,T - Pj,T-1) / Pj,T-1]  
= Πth=1 [1 + (Pj,h + Divj,h - Pj,h-1) / Pj,h-1]. 
The natural logarithm of RWIj,t is  
 ln(RWIj,t) = ln[1 + (Pj,1 + Divj,1 - Pj,0) / Pj,0] + ln[1 + (Pj,2 + Divj,2 - Pj,1) / Pj,1]  
… + ln[1 + (Pj,t + Divj,t - Pj,t-1) / Pj,t-1]  
= ΣTt=1 ln[1 + (Pj,t + Divj,t - Pj,t-1) / Pj,t-1] = ΣTt=1 ln[(Pj,t + Divj,t) / Pj,t-1]. 
The benchmark rate of return based on the eleven comparables is an equally weighted average of 
the ∆ln(RWIj,t),  
RC,t = (1/11) Σ11j=1 ∆ln(RWIj,t) = (1/11) Σ11j=1 ln[1 + (Pj,t + Divj,t - Pj,t-1) / Pj,t-1]  
= (1/11) Σ11j=1 ln[(Pj,t + Divj,t) / Pj,t-1].  
The overall period, which ends on October 8, 2005, has 2591 observations for Nordea 
and 2811 observations for the comparables.4 Figure 1.A gives a comparison of Nordea and 
comparables (log) relative wealth indices over the period 1995 through 2003. This was the 
period initially examined, and it reveals important instabilities which carry over to the additional 
data for 2004 through October 8, 2005, which were used to update the sample. Each series is 
normalized to set its index equal to 100 (and the indices in natural logs to 4.6051702) at the start 
of the data for Nordea (November 2, 1995); the two series are then plotted on the same scale. As 
                                                 
4 The first 221 (220) observations for the index (rate of return) are missing for Nordea. This corresponds to the start 
of data availability for Nordbanken, and reflects Data Stream's decision that Nordbanken rather than Merita is the 
initial Nordea holding company (Merita data are available for the full 2811 days). Without examing the data, it was 
decided to follow Data Stream's approach. The comparables rates of return start at day 1, even though FNSPK starts 
at 116; the decision to start with 10 and then go to 11 comparables was made before examining the data. 
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Figure 1.A illustrates, Nordea outperformed the comparables in the early part of the sample 
period, in the sense of having larger average rates of return, but underperformed in the later part.  
Figure 1.B shows that Nordea performed roughly as well as the comparables for the sample after 
2003; the data in Figure 1.B are broken into 1995 through 2000, 2001 through 2003, and 2004 
through October 7, 2005. As some readers have noted, the last of Nordea's major acquisitions 
was completed on October 16, 2000, (see Section 2 for the timing of Nordea's acquisitions) and 
thus Nordea's overperformance in the sample period 1995-2000 may be related to these 
acquisitions. The market's reactions to Nordea acquisitions are discussed in detail below. 
The relationship in Figure 1.A can be seen in two other sets of figures. Figures 2 and 3 
give the rates of return on Nordea and the comparables, in graphical and tabular forms for the 
sample period 1995-2003, in decimal percent per day. For 1995-2003, Nordea and the 
comparables have very similar mean rates of return, for Nordea 18.7%/annum (= 0.000748 x 100 
x 250), and for the complarables 17.35%/annum (= 0.000694 x 100 x 250), calculated for years 
with 250 trading days.5 Descriptive statistics for the 784 days' worth of observations from 2001-
2003 are shown in Figures 4 and 5 for both Nordea and the comparables. The mean rate of return 
for Nordea is -7.15%/annum, and for the comparables 10.25%/annum. Thus, Nordea 
underperformed by 17.40%/annum over this period. (The mean rates of return for Nordea and the 
comparables for the earlier period that omits the 2001-2003 are 33.80%/annum and 
20.825%/annum, or Nordea outperformed the comparables by 12.975%/annum.) On the one 
hand, the rates of return on financial institutions as a whole are notably lower in 2001-2003, 
                                                 
5 The comparables have a median of 0.000852, reflecting the left skewness of the comparable rates of return; Nordea 
has a median of zero, reflecting the right skewness on its rates of return. The Nordea and comparables standard 
deviations of rates of return are 0.023632 and 0.009511, or 37.365473%/annum and 15.038211%/annum; the 
difference reflects in part the fact that the comparables are an average and thus show diversification effects that 
reduce the average’s variance. Both distributions show positive and significant excess kurtosis (fat tails relative to a 
normal distribution). Further, from the Jarque-Bera statistic, both distributions are far from normal. 
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measured by both Nordea and the comparables. On the other hand, Nordea underperformed the 
comparables in the sample period 2001-2003.  
Two possible interpretations of the data suggest themselves. First, assuming that Nordea 
and the comparables have the same expected/required rates of return over the sample period 
1995-2003, the comparables approximately matched their required rate of return and Nordea beat 
its (and the comparables') required rate of return over the sample period 1995-2000, but Nordea 
underperformed relative to its required rate of return in the sample period 2001-2003. Second, 
consider a hypotheis which is investingated below. Nordea's performance approximately 
matched its required rate of return in both sample periods, 1995-2000 and 2001-2003, but 
Nordea's required rate of return was substantially lower in the second sample period. Turn to 
evidence relative to this second possibility. 
 Parameter Instability. The results in Figures 1-5 suggest that (a) the relationship between 
Nordea rates of return and comparables rates of return may be unstable, and related (b) the use of 
comparables as the benchmark may not be appropriate. Though the use of comparables as a 
benchmark is common, its underlying assumptions do not always hold. In particular, if the 
abnomal return is formed as ARN,t = RN,t - RC,t, where RN,t is the rate of return on Nordea at t and 
RC,t the benchmark rate of return on the comparables, the implicit assumption is that the beta for 
each priced, economy-wide factor is the same for Nordea and the comparables, or βN,k,t ≈ βC,k,t 
for k = 1,K, where K is the number of priced factors, so that both Nordea and the comparables 
have the same required rate of return.6 This assumption is not valid in the Nordea case, as seen 
below by examining market models.7  
                                                 
6 Let the expected/required rate of return be ERj,t = E0 + ∑Kk=1 βj,k,t λk, where E0 is the required rate of return on a 
portfolio with no beta risk, βj,k,t the beta of asset j on risk factor k at t, and λk the risk premium on risk factor k 
(assumed time-constant), and exact factor pricing is assumed. The actual return is Rj,t = E0 + ∑Kk=1 βj,k,t λk + ∑Kk=1 
βj,k,t δk,t + εj,t, where δk,t is the surprise in risk factor k at time t, and εj,t the idiosyncratic return to j. If an index of 
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 Table 1 shows three types of regressions for four sub-periods. Nordea rates of return are 
regressed on market rates of return and on comparables rates of returns, and comparables rates of 
return are regressed on market rates of return. Results are reported for the sample periods 1995 
through 2003, for 1995 through 2000, for 2001 through 2003, and for 2004 through October 7, 
2005. The market proxy is the Financial Times world market index including dividends, 
converted from U.S. dollars to Danish kronor. (In experiments, alternative market indices do not 
affect major conclusions.) These market models can be thought of as simplified versions of 
linear multi-factor asset-pricing models, where non-market, priced risk factors are omitted;8 
Sweeney and Warga (1986) discuss multi-factor asset-pricing models. 
 Instability in Nordea’s Market Beta. The market betas for both the comparables and 
Nordea, but especially Nordea, show instability over time,9 as illustrated in Table 1, columns A 
and C: for the 1995-2003 sample period and its two sub-periods, the betas for Nordea are 
[0.327234, 0.550798, 0.083736] and for the comparables are [0.394593, 0.419814, 0.365004]. 
For the 1995-2003 period, the market beta estimates are 0.394593 for the comparables and 
                                                                                                                                                             
comparables is used to adjust Rj,t, the abnormal return is ARj,t = Rj,t - RC,t = E0 + ∑Kk=1 βj,k,t λk + ∑Kk=1 βj,k,t δk,t + εj,t - 
(E0 + ∑Kk=1 βC,k,t λk + ∑Kk=1 βC,k,t δk,t + εC,t). If βj,k,t ≈ βC,k,t for all k,t then ERj,t - ERC,t = E0 + ∑Kk=1 βj,k,t λk - E0 - ∑Kk=1 
βC,k,t λk  ≈ 0, and ARj,t ≈ ∑Kk=1 (βj,k,t - βC,k,t) δk,t + (εj,t - εC,t) ≈ (εj,t - εC,t). Assuming that the comparables portfolio is 
well diversified, then εC,t ≈ 0 and ARj,t ≈ εj,t. The method of comparbles is designed to detect significant averages of 
εj,t. But consider the effects of βj,k,t ≠ βC,k,t, for example, βj,k,t > βC,k,t. If δk,t = 0 = εj,t = εC,t so the analyst would expect 
expected ARj,t = 0, instead ARj,t = (βj,k,t - βC,k,t) λk > < 0 as λk > < 0; thus, j will appear to out- or under-perform the 
comparables simply because it has higher beta risk. Note that if the average ARj,t is positive, this is interpreted as the 
average εj,t being positive, and the firm earning a higher average return over the period than can be explained by 
risk. Note further that if the market reacts to an event such as an acquisition by showing a sequence of say positive 
εj,t before and after the event, this can be interpreted as the market efficiently learning about the event and its 
implications, or as slow adjustment due to inefficiency.    
7 A closely related issue is the stability of the parameters in the data generating processes for both Nordea and the 
comparables: if the DGPs show temporal instability, this instability must be accounted for if parameters are to be 
correctly estimated in investigating whether βN,k,t ≈ βC,k,t.  
8 Experiments were tried on using some multi-factor models to explain Nordea rates of return, essentially using 
levels and first differences of interest rates (see Sweeney and Warga 1986). In models that included the market, none 
of the variables was statistically significant.  
9 In experiments, adding lagged values of the market term to allow for possible thin-trading typically does not 
significantly affect the sum of market betas, sometimes raising and sometimes reducing the point estimates of the 
market beta.   
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0.327234—20.58% less—for Nordea. For the comparables, sub-period beta estimates range from 
a high of 0.419814 in the first sub-period to a low of 0.365004 (15.02% less) in second sub-
period (2001-2003). Nordea betas show a substantially greater range, from a high of 0.550798 in 
the first sub-period to a low of 0.083736 [less by 557.78% = (0.550798 / 0.083736 - 1) x 100] in 
the second sub-period, and the data reject the null that the betas are the same across the two sub-
periods at the 0.00004 significance level. The comparables market beta thus shows some 
instability, but is relatively stable compared to the Nordea beta.10  
It might be wondered whether the market beta is stable across the sample period 1995-
2000: when the sample period 1995-2000 is broken into 1995-1997 and 1998-2000, the 
estimated betas (t-values) [R2s] are 0.548119 (4.555669) [0.057358] and 0.550374 (5.560694) 
[0.078781], consistent with market-beta stability. It should be noted that the first of Nordea's 
three major acquisitions started on October 12, 1997, and the third was completed by October 16, 
2000; thus, the stability of the beta across sub-periods of 1995-2000 strongly suggests that the 
acquisitions were not per se the cause of beta instability.  
Jensen's Alpha. Jensen's alpha is a common measure of performance. In the Nordea 
market-model regressions in Table 1, the issue is whether the estimated intercept is significantly 
different from (1 - β) rf, where β is the market beta and rf is the risk-free rate. For both the 1995-
2000 and 2001-2003 sample periods, the estimated intercept is not significantly different from (1 
- β) rf at conventional significance levels, where a short-term DKK rate is used as the risk-free 
rate. 
                                                 
10 If the sample period 1995-2000 is taken as the base case, data reject the null that the true beta is the 2001-2003 
sample period estimate of 0.365004 at the 9.01% significance level. If the sample period 2001-2003 is taken as the 
base case, data reject the null that the true beta is the 1995-2000 sample period estimate of 0.419814 at the 9.54% 
level. 
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 Updating the Data. After an earlier version of this paper analyzed the data for 1995 
through 2003, the data were updated to include data for 2004 through October 8, 2005. For the 
sample period 2004-2005, the Nordea market beta jumps to 0.497619 with a t-value of 6.006368, 
and R2 = 0.091248. Thus, the instability in Nordea betas detected by examing the sub-periods 
1995-2000 and 2001-2003 continues in the latest sub-period considered. (The data strongly reject 
the null that the Nordea betas are the same in the 2001-2003 and the 2004-2005 sub-periods. The 
data cannot reject the null, however, that the betas are the same in the 1995-2000 and 2004-2005 
sub-periods.11)  
 The results above are consistent with the view that Nordea did not outperform the 
comparables in the 1995-2000 period or underperform in the 2001-2003 period, but rather the 
apparent performance arose from temporal instability in Nordea's required rate of return. 
Comparables as the Benchmark in Regressions. Results from regressing the Nordea 
holding company rate of return on the comparables rate of return are consistent with these 
market-model results and also with the implications of Figures 1.A and 1.B. In Table 1, column 
B, for the first sub-period 1995-2000, the Nordea and comparables rates of return series tended 
to move together (a slope of 1.172931 with a t-value of 16.95523, and an R2 = 0.272837), but in 
the period 2001-2003, the series show essentially no relationship—indeed the slope is negative, -
0.043613, and insignificant (a t-value of -0.406356), with an R2 = 0.000259. Thus, in the first 
sub-period, the generally positive movements in comparables are matched by more than 
proportionate movements in Nordea's total return index, but in the second sub-period, the 
                                                 
11 In market-model regressions for comparables, the data strongly reject the null that the betas in the 2001-2003 and 
2004-2005 sample periods (0.365004 and 0.255341) are equal and that the betas in the 1995-2003 and 2004-2005 
sample periods (0.394593, 0.255341) are equal.  
     Note that in the sample period 2004-2005, the market betas for Nordea and the comparables are 0.497619 and 
0.255341, suggesting that Nordea should have a larger average rate of return than the comparables. The mean rates 
of return, however, are 0.000895/day and 0.001182/day, a difference of 32%; this might, of course, be due to the 
sample size (462 days). 
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generally positive movements in comparables are accompanied by essentially unrelated 
movements in Nordea's total return index.  
 Announcement Effects.  Nordbanken announced the planned merger with Merita on 
October 12, 1997, a Sunday (so the event date is taken as Oct. 13, observation 733), and the deal 
was completed on November 26, 1997 (observation 765). The combined Norbanken plus Merita 
(Nordic Baltic Holding Company) announced the attempt to acquired Unidanmark, and the 
attempt’s success, on the same day, March 6, 2000 (observation 1358). Finally, the combined 
bank (MeritaNordbanken) announced its attempt to acquire Christiana Bank on September 24, 
1999 (observation 1242) and the attempt’s success on October 16, 2000 (observation 1518). 
To start, rates of return and abnormal returns for the acquiring Nordea institution12 are 
calculated around these five events; the benchmark for the abnormal rates of return for the 
acquiring Nordea institution is the index of comparables. (The components of Nordea of course 
change with acquisitions; the evolution of Nordea is given above. Note that Nordbanken is 
viewed as the acquiring institution in the combination with Merita.) In each case, a window of 20 
trading days before and 20 trading days after is initially used. The acquiring Nordea institution’s 
mean log rates of return (standard error)13 for each event are:  
Event     Rate of Return   Abnormal Return 
1. Announcement of   -0.000830 (0.002298)   -0.001602 (0.002107)  
attempt to acquire Merita 
2. Acquisition of Merita   0.003927 (0.003401)    0.001587 (0.002682)   
successful 
3. Announcement of successful  0.000805 (0.002761)   -0.000991 (0.002438)   
attempt to acquire Unidanmark 
4. Announcement of attempt    0.000249 (0.003000)     0.000271 (0.002643)    
                                                 
12 A footnote below discusses the wealth effects on the acquired institutions. 
13 The standard error of the mean return or mean abnormal return is the standard deviation divided by the N1/2, where 
N is the number of observations used to form the mean, here N = 41. The square root of 41 is 6.403124237, and 
1/N1/2 = 0.156173761. The standard deviation is calculated as the standard deviation of the 100 observations before 
the event window.   
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to acquire Christiana Bank 
5. Acquisition of Christiana    0.002456 (0.003337)    0.000314 (0.003296)   
Bank successful 
Average        0.0012422 → 33.555%/yr  -0.000421 → -10.525%/yr 
 
The results are quite different for the Nordea rates of returns and the abnormal rates of return: the 
average of the Nordea returns across the five events is 33.555%/annum, but the average 
abnormal return across events is -10.525%/annum. Note, however, that no event's rate of return 
or abnormal return is significantly different from zero at conventional levels. Note further that 
examination of the abnormal returns shows that the 20 days prior to the events show little 
evidence of leakage and add little on average to the mean abnormal return; hence, only the event 
date and the next 20 days are used in what follows. Figures 6-10 show cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) for each of the five events, for the event date and 20 following days; a number of 
the positive CARs in events 2 and 3 are statistically significant. To investigate the significance of 
each event in its 20-day window, regression analysis is used.  
The sensitivity of results to forming abnormal returns suggests experimenting with other 
indices to form abnormal returns, as is done below by using the rates of return from the market 
index. The parameter instability detected above also suggests trying alternative sample periods.     
 Market-Model Results for Nordea and Comparables. Table 2.A shows event-study 
market-model regressions in which each of the five events is represented by a dummy that takes 
on the value of unity on the event date and for 20 days thereafter, with the dummy equal to zero 
otherwise (footnotes discuss 101-day event windows). Regressions are run for both Nordea and 
for the equally weighted index of comparables as the dependent variable; a regression is also run 
for Nordea as the dependent variable and the equally weighted index of comparables as the 
dependent variable. For the Nordea market-model regression, all event-coefficients are positive, 
and the second and third events’ coefficients are significant at the 4.17% and 0.53% levels 
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respectively.14, 15 For the comparables market-model regression, the first and fourth events have 
negative coefficient, with the other events' coefficients positive; the second event is has a 
positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 0.00004% level. Wald tests, of the null 
that all event-coefficients in a given regression are zero, are used to judge whether the set of 
events as a whole is statistically significant. In the Wald tests, the F-statistic is statistically 
significant at the 3.12% level for the Nordea market-model regression16, and at the 0.004% level 
for the comparables market-model regression.17, 18   
 Event-Study Regressions, with Comparables as the Independent Variable. Results from 
the market-model event-study regressions suggest re-running the regressions with the rate of 
return on the comparables as the explanatory variable. Table 2.A shows the results for the whole 
                                                 
14 This footnote discusses the wealth effects on the acquired institutions; the reported results take account of the 
parameter instability in market models that a subsection below discusses. For Merita, both events have positive 
coefficients and the second event's coefficient is significant at the 0.39% level. For Unidanmark, the third event (the 
announcement of the merger attempt and its success was the same day) has a positive coefficient that is significant at 
only the 34.8% level. Bank Scope does not provide data on Christiana Bank of Norway, the third target, for the 
period of its acquisition.  
15 An important literature discusses the behavior of abnormal returns over long windows; for a summary and 
important work, see Eberhart and Siddique (200X). When a 101 day window (including the event day) is used, four 
of the five events have a positive coefficient (the fourth event's is negative), but none is significant at even the 10% 
level. In a Wald test that all coefficients are zero, the data reject the null at the 0.3832 significance level.  
16 Under the assumption that each event has a 21-day window and the slope is the same for each event, the single 
event dummy has a slope of 0.004252, significant at the 7.89% level. Under the assumption that each event has a 
101-day window and the slope is the same for each event, the single event dummy has a slope of -0.027481, highly 
insignificant, at the 80.11% level.   
17 Including lagged values of the market rate of return, to adjust for possible thin-trading, does not importantly affect 
the coefficients on the event dummies or their significance. 
18 When major events such as Nordea mergers and acquisitions occur, betas may well show volatility. Following 
Chan (1986), suppose the Nordea beta shifts at the dates of the events. In a market-model regression that allows for 
five shifts in beta for the duration of each event window, only the interaction term of the market and the event 
dummy at the time of the first event is significant, at the 4.64% level. When event dummies are included separately 
in a regression that allows for shifts in the market beta at each event date for the duration of each event window, the 
second and third event dummies have significantly positive coefficients, at the 4.07% and 4.21% levels; again only 
the beta-shift at the first event is significant. The slopes on the second and third event dummies in this regression are 
0.014547 and 0.006577 as compared to the slopes 0.015168 and 0.006588 in Table 2.  
     When 101-day event windows are used, and betas shift with event dummies, and event dummies are entered 
separately, the first and fifth beta-shifts are significant, at the 6.50% and 5.98% levels, and only the third event 
dummy's coefficient is significant, at the 8.64% level.  
     When 101-day event windows are used and the slope is the same for each event, the interaction term between the 
market and the event dummy is insignificant, and the single event dummy entered separately has a slope of 
0.001757, significant at the 5.94% level.  
 16
period. All events have positive effects, and events 2 and 3 are statistically significant at the 
10.63% and 0.56% levels respectively. In a Wald test that all event coefficients enter with zero 
coefficients, the probability is 5.27%.19  
 Effects of Parameter Instability. The parameter instability that Table 1 reveals for 
regressions of Nordea rates of return on either market or comparables rates of return suggests 
that the event study results in Table 2.A might be affected by rerunning the regressions to allow 
for parameter shifts. This is done over the period 1995-2003, allowing for intercept and beta 
shifts at the end of 2000 (comparable to Table 1). The shift in the intercept is far from significant 
and has little effect on estimated slopes of event dummies, and hence is omitted in regressions 
reported here. In the three regressions in Table 2.B, the shift in the beta is important. In 
regressions of Nordea rates of return on the market, the slope on the second event dummy 
becomes less significant, and the slope on the third event dummy becomes insignificant. In 
regressions of Nordea rates of return on comparables, the slopes on the second and third event 
dummies both become insignificant. In regressions of comparables rates of return on the market, 
the slope on the second event dummy becomes less significant.20  
 Results for Two Individual Comparables. When using an index of comparables as a 
benchmark, it is possible that the index misrepresents or distorts what is going on with some of 
the important consitutents of the index. To shed light on this issue, Table 3 reports maket-model 
and event-study regressions regressions for two major banks, Danske (Danske Banken) of 
Denmark and SHB (Svenska Handelsbanken) of Sweden, both viewed by many as profit leaders 
and among the stronger Nordic financial institutions. For the sample periods 1995-2003, 1995-
                                                 
19 Including lagged values of the comparables rate of return does not importantly affect the coefficients on the event 
dummies and their significance. 
20 In the three regressions in Table 2.B, at conventional significance levels the data cannot reject the null that all of 
the slopes on the event dummies are equal to zero. 
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2000 and 2001-2003, the market betas for Danske and SHB are (0.386581, 0.358502, 0.412774) 
and (0.618432, 0.592077, 0.646364). It is notable that Danske has lower market betas in general 
that does SHB. More important for present issues, it is clear that both institutions' betas show 
much greater temporal stability than do Nordea's betas, verifying the greater stability of the 
comparables' betas relative to Nordea's betas.  
Parameter Instability, and Market versus Comparables as Benchmark. For evaluating 
Nordea, this evidence of the sensitivity of results suggests that one should investigate parameter 
instability before accepting the existence of non-zero wealth effects. Further, at a methods level, 
these results suggest that it is important to investigate and report the sensistivity of wealth effects 
to the benchmark used. Finally, it is clear that use of comparables in evaluating Nordea's 
performance is difficult at a minimum and likely to be viewed by many as questionable.  
Beta Instability, and Nordea’s Small Beta in the 2001-2003 Sample Period. Whether the 
benchmark is the market or the comparables, Tables 1 and 2 show that Nordea’s beta on the 
benchmark is highly unstable; in particular, though Nordea’s benchmark-beta is positive at 
highly significantly levels in the 1995-2000 sub-period, the beta declines until it is essentially 
zero in the three-year period from 2001 to 2003. In evaluating this instability, the discussion 
focuses for convenience on the market index. 
The instability in Nordea’s market beta is a warning to the analyst evaluating Nordea’s 
performance. Evaluation cannot be carried out as though the beta were approximately constant, 
or rather fluctuated only with the amount consistent with sampling variability. The low Nordea 
beta over the 2001-2003 sub-period suggests that Nordea’s expected rate of return should be low, 
approximately the risk-free rate of return.  
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Mechanically, the later period’s beta of (approximately) zero implies that consciously or 
not Nordea arranged its assets and liabilities to provide a virtually complete net hedge against 
(world) market movements.21 Success is then measured by beating the risk-free rate. An 
important question is why Nordea's management adopted policies that set its market beta to zero; 
only Nordea's management can aswer this question. Related, another important question was 
whether the market knew that the beta was so low and thus the implied hurdle rate for measuring 
success was so low. From the results above, the data are consistent with the view that the market 
understood that Nordea's hurdle rate was low: Because of Nordea's high market beta and thus 
high required rate of return in the sample period 1995-2000, Nordea could be expected to 
outperform the comparables, as it did; because of Nordea's low market beta and thus low 
required rate of return in the sample period 1995-2000, Nordea could be expected to 
underperform the comparables, as it did.   
 An interpretation of the decline in beta in the sample period 2001-2003 and its subsequent 
rise during 2004-2005 is that the original merger of the four entities (finished towards the end of 
2000) created a diversified low risk financial conglomerate but, thereafter, management's 
restructuring removed or reduced the weight of low return-low risk activities. Management's 
focus on increasing profitability can have these consequences, if management is unaware of the 
relative riskiness of different product lines and if market signals about risk and return are initially 
hard to read. One can argue that in banking market signals with respect to risk and return are 
often hard to read as a result of explicit and implicit guarantees of creditors. It appears that after 
                                                 
21 This low beta is reminiscent of risk-neutral or zero-beta hedge funds. This is not an assertion that Nordea can be 
thought of as a hedge fund, but simply an observation. For a discussion of systematic risk in hedge funds, see Chan 
et al. 2004. For a discussion and analysis of the notorious Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund, see Jorion 
(2000). 
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pursuing a low risk-low return strategy during 2001-2003, management saw the consequences 
that low risk had for returns and reverted to a higer risk-higher return strategy.  
Problems in Using Comparables to Evaluate Nordea. It is worthwhile to spell out some of 
the problems encountered in using comparables to evaluate Nordea. Using comparables to adjust 
to give abnomal returns makes most sense when the required rates of return on Nordea and the 
comparables are equal. Suppose the required rate of return on Nordea’s levered equity is 
determined by the CAPM, or RRN,eq,t = rf,t + βN,eq,t (ERM,,t - rf,t), where rf,t is the risk-free rate at 
time t, βN,eq,t Nordea’s levered equity beta and (ERM,,t - rf,t) the risk premium on the market. 
Similarly, in the CAPM the required equity rate of return on the comparables is RRC,eq,t = rf,t + 
βC,eq,t (ERM,,t - rf,t). The difference is RRN,eq,t - RRC,eq,t = rf,t + βN,eq,t (ERM,,t - rf,t) - rf,t - βC,eq,t (ER-
M,,t - rf,t) = (βN,eq,t - βC,eq,t ) (ERM,,t - rf,t). If βN,eq,t ≈ 0.0, then RRN,eq,t ≈ rf,t, and the difference 
RRN,eq,t - RRC,eq,t is (βN,eq,t - βC,eq,t ) (ERM,,t - rf,t) ≈ - βC,eq,t  (ERM,,t - rf,t). Because βC,eq,t is perhaps 
0.50, the difference RRN,eq,t - RRC,eq,t is substantial and likely too large for use of the 
comparables as the benchmark to make sense for the sample period 2001-2003. The comparables 
expected rate of return should be higher by their beta for this period (≈ 0.50) times the risk 
premium on the market, or should be higher by about 2 1/2% if the market risk premium is taken 
as 5%/annum. 
Implications for Analysis of Accounting Data. The arrangement of assets and liabilities 
that gives a Nordea beta of approximately zero in the sample period 2001-2003 implies expected 
values of ROE and ROA that are similarly low, and also implies a low expected Return on 
Invested Capital (ROIC) in free cash flow (FCF) models. Do analysts understand this?   
Accounting valuation models depend on discount rates versus accounting rates of return. 
Residual Income models (Edwards-Bell-Ohlson models) of equity value (Ohlson 1995, Feltham 
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and Ohlson 1999) have received much attention (Dechow et al. 1999, Myers 1999a,b, Nissim 
and Penman 1999, Penman and Sougiannis 1998, Francis et al. 2000); these models require use 
of levered-equity discount rates. The Residual Income model of equity value depends on the 
ROEt - RReq,t and the Penman model of firm value depends on ROAt - RRU,eq,t where RRU,eq,t is 
the unlevered equity beta at t. For example, in the Residual Income model, the current value of 
the firm's levered equity is 
       EQ0 = ∑∞t=1 RIt / Πtj=1 (1 + RReq,j) + B0 = ∑∞t=1 [(ROEt - RReq,t) Bt-1] / Πtj=1 (1 + RReq,j) + B0, 
where RIt = (ROEt - RReq,t) Bt-1 and Bt is the book value of equity at time t. In expositions of the 
RI model (Ohlson 1995, Feltham and Ohlson 1999), it is generally assumed that over time ROEt 
→ RReq,t, ceteris paribus, and thus EQt → Bt. Assuming ROEt → RReq,t and RReq,t varies over 
time, ROEt will also vary over time from this source (among other sources of variation), though 
with lags as ROEt "tries" to catch up with a time-varying RReq,t. Note that if Nordea’s levered 
equity beta is approximately zero, then RRN,eq,t ≈ rf,t and eventually competitive pressures will 
drive ROEN,t to rf,t. Similarly, competitive pressures will drive ROAN,t to RRN,U,eq,t, where 
RRN,U,eq,t ≈ rf,t (supposing that the betas on Nordea's debt and tax savings are approximately 
zero).22  
In contrast to RI models of equity value, many analysts find the firm's overall value from 
Free Cash Flow models, most frequently using a weighted average cost of capital that requires a 
levered-equity discount rate (Copeland et al. 2000). In WACC versions of the Free Cash Flow 
Model of firm valuation, the firm’s current value depends on ROICt - WACCt,   
V0 = ∑∞t=1 ROICt / Πtj=1 (1 + WACCj) + K0  
                                                 
22 The assumption that the betas on Nordea's debt and tax savings are approximately zero is consistent with the 
assumption that the levered-equity beta is zero. The unlevered equity beta can be found by the same procedures for 
non-zero betas on debt and tax savings.  
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= ∑∞t=1 {[(NOPLATt / Kt-1) - WACCt] Kt-1} / Πtj=1 (1 + WACCj) + K0                      
where ROICt = (NOPLATt - WACCt Kt-1), NOPLATt is Net Operating Profit less Adjusted  
Taxes (see Copeland et al. 2000), and Kt is the firm's capital stock. The Nordea WACC discount 
rate is WACCN,t = wN,t-1 RRN,eq,t + (1 - wN,t-1) (1 - t*) RRN,D,t, where wN,t-1 is the equity value 
ratio for Nordea, t* is the tax rate, and RRN,D,t is the required rate of return on Nordea’s debt 
financing. For RRN,eq,t ≈ rf,t, WACCN,t ≈ wN,t-1 rf,t + (1 - wN,t-1) (1 - t*) RRN,D,t. Competitive 
pressures will drive ROICN,t to WACCN,t ≈ wN,t-1 rf,t + (1 - wN,t-1) (1 - t*) RRN,D,t; in particular, if 
RRN,D,t ≈ rf,t, then competitive pressures will drive ROICt to WACCN,t ≈ rf,t [1 - t* (1 - wN,t-1)] < 
rf,t for t*, wN,t-1 > 0. Hence, the low value of βN,eq,t and hence RReq,t implies that ROEN,t, ROAN,t 
and ROICN,t must eventually be comparably low. Similar to the analysis above, if (NOPLATt / 
Kt-1) → WACCt, ceteris paribus, then ROICt → 0 and Vt →Kt. Assuming ROICt → WACCt and 
WACCt varies over time, ROICt will also vary over time from this source (among other sources 
of variation), though with lags as ROICt "tries" to catch up with a time-varying WACCt. 
 As noted above, the small Nordea market beta of 0.083736 in the 2001-2003 rebounds 
substantially to 0.497619 in the sample period 2004-2005. From discussion above, these 
fluctuations in Nordea's market beta imply fluctuations in Nordea's required rate of return and 
thus in ROEt, ROAt and ROICt.       
Financial Results for 1999-2004. The following section analyzes accounting data for 
Nordea relative to comparables. Accounting data are available for the Nordea holding company 
for the six years 1999-2004. As preparation analysis of accounting data, note that over these six 
years, the mean rate of return on Nordea shares is 0.000375 (9.375%) and the mean return on 
comparables shares is 0.000749 (18.725%). The difference between the means for Nordea and 
the comparables is -.000374. But note that the standard error is 0.0005255, and the t-value of the 
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difference is -.000374 / 0.0005255 = 0.7076179, insignificant at conventional levels. In a 
regression of the Nordea returns on the comparables, the slope (t-value) is 0.356113 (5.747967), 
with R2 = 0.018385;23 further, the intercept is 0.000108, or in annual terms 2.70%/annum. The 
financial data suggest that Nordea might be expected to show sub-par performance relative to the 
comparables when accounting data are analyzed. But note that from the results in Table 1 the 
accounting-data sample period 1999-2004 appears to be made up of two separate regimes, the 
low-beta period identified for 2001-2003, and the higher-beta period indentified for 2004-2005. 
4. Accounting Data and Nordea’s Performance 
 In the following, accounting data are used in three ways for evaluation purposes. First, the 
Nordea holding company is compared with six of the largest Nordic financial institutions in the 
sample of comparables: Danske Bank and Jyske Bank from Denmark, Sampo from Finland, DnB 
NOR Bank ASA from Norway, and SEB and SHB from Sweden. Second, the Nordea holding 
company is compared with the complete set of 16 Nordic comparables. Third, the Nordea bank 
in each Nordic country is compared with the comparables holding companies from that country. 
Data on ROE (Return on Equity) and ROA (Return on Assets) are in Table 4 for the six largest 
comparables, in Table 5 for the complete set of comparables; both tables give data on the Nordea 
holding company, Nordea Bank AB (consolidated), and the Nordea banks. Table 7 shows 
cost/income ratios for Nordea banks and large comparables. More complete data for the Nordea 
holding company and banks and for the comparables are in Appendix D (available from the 
                                                 
23 These results are consistent with market-model regressions of Nordea and comparables rates of returns. In a 
regression of Nordea rates of return on the market, the slope (t-value) are 0.186641 (4.157926), with R2 =0.009706, 
and in a regression of comparables rates of return on the market, the slope (t-value) are 0.322326 (20.97804), with 
R2 = 0.199665.    
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authors). Note that the levered financial rates of return used in the preceeding section are 
comparable to the levered ROE,24 not to the unlevered ROA. 
Because each of the comparables is a financial holding company, the validity of 
comparisons is greater when evaluating the Nordea holding company relative to the comparables 
than when the individual Nordea banks are evaluated relative to the comparables. Each 
comparable contains commercial banking operations, investment banking, asset management and 
insurance activities, as does the Nordea holding company (though over time Nordea has disposed 
of some of its insurance activities). The Nordea banks in the four countries, however, essentially 
include only banking operations, not the full range of financial services as the comparables do. 
The Nordea banks, as is true of the comparables' banks, are not traded separately in the market; 
Nordea puts together its banks' data separately from Nordea holding company data, and the 
Nordea bank data are not necessarily stated in the ways that would be required if these banks 
traded in the market.  
 The Nordea Holding Company. To examine the performance of the Nordea holding 
company, Nordea Bank AB (consolidated) is used. Nordea Bank AB data are available for six 
years, 1999-2004. For evaluation purposes, these data may be examined alongside data for 
comparables over the same six years, or for the longer period for which data on (some though not 
all of) the comparables are available. Both sorts of comparisons are made in Tables 6.A and 6.B.  
 Relative to the average of the largest Nordic comparables, ROE is smaller for the Nordea 
holding company in both the longer and shorter periods, but ROA is larger for the Nordea 
holding company in both the longer and shorter periods. (In these comparisons, the larger value 
is in boldface in Tables 6.A and 6.B.) Relative to the average of all Nordic comparables, 
                                                 
24 For example, recall from the preceding section that residual income is calculated as (ROEt - RR) Bt-1, where Bt is 
the book value of equity and RR is the required rate of return implicit in financial rates of return.                 
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however, the Nordea holding company ROE is larger for both the longer and shorter periods. 
Relative to the average for all Nordic comparables, the Nordea holding company ROA is smaller 
for both the longer and shorter periods. Taken together, the results for the large comparables and 
for all comparables, and for ROE and ROA, suggest that Nordea performed about as well as the 
Nordic comparables.25   
Looking at the devlopments after Nordea’s mergers were completed at the end of 2000, the 
Nordea holding company has approximately caught up with the average ROE and ROA for the 
large comparables after relatively weak performance in 2002 and 2003. 
         Cost/income ratios should shed light on whether Nordea has benefited from scale and scope 
economies after the mergers or whether the costs of integrating four financial institutions in and 
with different cultures have offset such benefits. Table 7 shows the cost/income ratios for Nordea 
and five large comparables.26 Comparing Nordea as a whole with the average for the 
comparables it can be seen that Nordea had a lower ratio than the comparables at the time the 
mergers were completed at the end of 2000. Thereafter, Nordea’s efficiency declined sharply in 
2002 before nearly catching up with the comparables again in 2004. Thus, it seems that any 
efficiency benefits from the mergers have yet to appear.  
 Nordea Banks in Individual Nordic Countries. In general for Nordic countries, the 
Nordea bank has a larger ROE, for both the longer period and the shorter period, than 
comparable Nordic holding companies; the exception is Norway for the shorter period. For 
ROA, however, results are somewhat mixed: for eight comparisons, Nordea banks have larger 
ROA in five cases, and the same ROA in a sixth case.  Note that the Nordea bank in Sweden has 
                                                 
25 The somewhat different results for ROE and ROA can, of course, be explained by arithmetic as arising from 
somewhat different leverage between Nordea and the comparables.  
26 Data for Jyske Bank are unavailable. Nevertheless, at least one large comparable is available for each Nordic 
country. 
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outliers in 2001 of 59.90 for ROE and 2.29 for ROA. The averages are recalculated omitting 
these data, with the results in parentheses; the values fall importantly, but the Nordea bank in 
Sweden still outperforms the comparables.   
 Note that the Nordea banks appear to show better performance relative to comparables in 
Denmark and (particularly) Sweden than in Finland and Norway.      
Cost/income ratios in the individual Nordea banks in Table 7 are not exactly comparable to 
the ratios for the other large banks in the table, since the Nordea banks do not include the full 
conglomerate activities in the individual countries. Thus, it is more interesting to look at relative 
trends in cost efficiency. Comparing Nordea Denmark with Danske Bank it appears that Danske 
Bank has become relatively more efficient after the integration of the Danish Unibank in Nordea 
late in 2000.  In Finland both Nordea and its major comparable Sampo have become more 
efficient; in Norway the competitor DnB has lowered its cost/income ratio relative to Nordea 
Norway during the period after 2000.  In Sweden Nordea’s bank has lost ground even more 
strongly relative to the major competitors SEB and SHB during the same period.  
The trends in profitability in Table 6.B indicate that ROE has been declining relatively 
for Nordea in all four Nordic countries, though less pronounced in Sweden in than elsewhere in 
spite of falling behind more there in terms of cost efficency. The comparables show an upward 
trend in ROE for Denmark and Finland, but not Norway and Sweden. For ROA, the Nordea 
banks show a downward trend in three Nordic countries but a slight increase in Finland. The 
comparables show an upward trend in ROA in Finland, 0.72 rising to 0.80, and small 
fluctuations for the other three countries. Thus, both profitability- and cost efficiency trends of 
Nordea banks are somewhat less favorable than the comparables.   
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Trends in Profitability. By comparing results in Table 6.B for the longer and shorter 
periods, the data can be used to investigate trends in profitability. For ROE there is a downward 
trend in Nordea’s profitability in all for Nordic countries, though less pronounced in Sweden (in 
relative terms) than elsewhere. The comparables show an upward trend in ROE for Denmark and 
Finland, but not Norway and Sweden. For ROA, the Nordea banks show a downward trend in 
three Nordic countries but a slight increase in Finland. The comparables show an upward trend in 
ROA in Finland, 0.72 rising to 0.80, and fluctuations of 0.01 for the other three countries. 
Profitability for Nordea banks thus tends to show somewhat less favorable trends than the 
comparables. Perhaps the Nordea banks' superior performance is being reduced over time.  
 Nordea Holding Company versus Nordea Banks. When these comparisons for the Nordea 
banks in individual countries are taken with comparisons for the Nordea holding company, they 
offer a puzzle. Focus on results for ROE; recall that ROE is comparable to the financial rates of 
return discussed in Section 3. On the one hand, the Nordea holding company does about as well 
on average as than the comparables in both the longer and shorter periods (Table 6.A). On the 
other hand, when Nordea banks are examined, for ROE the Nordea banks do better than the 
comparables in seven of eight cases (Table 6.B); the simple averages across the four countirs for 
Nordea and the comparables are 17.91% versus 13.323% in the longer period, and 15.32% 
versus 13.58% in the shorter period. (For ROA, the results are substantially more mixed.) 
Arithmetic implies that Nordea non-bank operations are less profitable than are Nordea banking 
operations.  
One explanation offered for this puzzle is that the performance of Nordea as a whole, but 
not the individual Nordea banks, was dragged down by Nordea's "General Insurance" operation. 
Nordea disposed of this operation in 2002. It is quite difficult to take account of the effect of 
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General Insurance. First, comparables holding companies all have some insurance operations, so 
both the Nordea and the comparables figures must be adjusted for general insurance. Second, the 
individual comparables treat general insurance in a variety of ways. For example, SHB's 
insurance operation was a mutual company and not included in the holding company's 
consolidated accounts until de-mutualization in 2002, and thus its effects need not be eliminated 
in earlier years. Some of SEB's insurance operations were consolidated in holding company 
accounts, some not. Sampo changed its relationship to various insurance operations over time, 
and its ownership share. DnB NOR ASA uses the equity method and thereby includes only the 
group's share in profits from the insurance subsidiary in their income statement, under "other 
income." For purposes of adjusting ROE to reflect General Insurance operations, the analyst 
needs the net income generated by the operations and the equity allocated to the operations; 
clearly, the data needed to calculate these figures are unavailable for many of the comparables. 
For this reason, only the effects of Nordea are shown. 
As the rough figures in Table 8 show, eliminating Nordea's general insurance operation 
appears to explain part of the puzzle, but by no means the whole. 
5. Summary Evaluation and Some Conclusions  
 Data for Nordea’s price and dividends are available for November 2, 1995 to October 8, 
2005. For the sample period 1995-2000, Nordea outperformed the comparables, but for the 
sample period 2001-2003, Nordea underperformed the comparables substantially. Nordea's 
market beta, however, was largers than the comparables' beta in the earlier period and smaller in 
the later period. It appears that Nordea's earlier over-performance and later under-performance 
can largely be explained by differences in systematic risk, and thus required and expected rates 
of return, across the two periods. Nordea's beta risk rebounded in the sample period from 
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January, 2004, to October, 2005, to a point estimate even larger than the beta estimate for the 
sample period 1995-2000—the instability of Nordea's beta risk continues.   
Announcements of the mergers and acquisitions that led to the creation of Nordea, when 
evaluated in a market-model regression, all have positive wealth effects, with one event having a 
statistically significant wealth effect. 
For the Nordea holding company, accounting data are available only for the six-year period 
1999-2004. Over this period, Nordea’s ROE and ROA are roughly the same as those of the 
comparables, when judged relative to both the large comparables and the set of all comparables. 
Again, the data support the view that Nordea performed about as well as the comparables. 
 In terms of accounting data, Nordea banks in individual Nordic countries outperformed 
comparables holding companies. In light of the roughly equal performance of the Nordea holding 
company relative to comparables holding companies, Nordea's non-banking businesses must 
perform less well than Nordea banks. One possible source of underperformance that is 
sometimes raised is Nordea's general insurance operations, which were sold in 2002. 
Calculations suggest that this is part of the story, but only a part.    
One viewpoint is that Nordea is correct about the gains to be reaped by being a large, 
integrated financial institution across all of the four Nordic countries. Another is that the 
economies of scale and scope that Nordea can hope to reap are not really there and that the costs 
of being a large, integrated financial institution across all of the four Nordic countries will defeat 
the Nordea experiment. So far the stock-market and accounting data cannot discriminate between 
the two views. 
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Table 1. Market-Model Regressions of Nordea and Comparables Rates of Return; 
Regressions of Nordea on Comparables Rates of Return 
 
 
A. Nordea       B. Nordea       C. Comparables 
 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.  Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.    Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
 
1995-2003 
Intercept  0.000654 1.449299 0.1474 Intercept   0.000207 0.523571 0.6006 Intercept   0.000586 3.352421 0.0008 
Market  0.327234 5.040393 0.0000*** Comparables  0.718861 7.778601 0.0000*** Market  0.394593 16.58197 0.0000 
R-squared  0.026185     R-squared  0.087444     R-squared  0.223605 
 
1995-2000  
Intercept   0.000939 1.709098 0.0877 * Intercept   0.000238 0.541985 0.5879 Intercept   0.000556 2.406359 0.0162 
Market  0.550798 6.830442 0.0000*** Comparables   1.172931 16.95523 0.0000*** Market  0.419814 12.98374 0.0000 
R-squared  0.071515     R-squared  0.272837     R-squared  0.210741  
 
2001-2003 
Intercept -0.000243 -0.301133 0.7634 Intercept -0.000268 -0.332088 0.7399 Intercept   0.000602 2.354054 0.0188 
Market  0.083736 0.908614 0.3638 Comparables  -0.043613 -0.406356 0.6846 Market  0.365004 11.10576 0.0000 
R-squared  0.001785     R-squared  0.000259     R-squared  0.249238 
 
====================================================================================================================== 
2004-2005 
Intercept 0.000639 1.480158 0.1395 Intercept -0.000771 -1.953224 0.0514* Intercept   0.001050 5.000109 0.0000 
Market 0.497619 6.006368 0.0000*** Comparables   1.409609 11.80393 0.0000*** Market   0.255341 6.184821 0.0000 
R-squared 0.091248     R-squared  0.357274     R-squared  0.133617 
 
Notes: All data are from Data Stream. Rates of return are measured in Danish kronor (DKK). Rates of return are calculated as differences of natural logs on indices. 
The data for the Nordea holding company start on day 221. The rate of return of the market is found from the Financial Times Total Returns Index, in USD, converted 
to DKK. The index for the comparables is computed from the eleven comparables for which daily returns data are available; for the first 116 days, only ten 
comparables are available.   
 
Regressions were initially computed for the nine years 1995-2003, and the sub-periods of 1995-2000 and 2001 to 2003. Regressions were then computed for 2004 and 
data from 2005 up through October 8, 2005.  
 
***,**,*  Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.A. Regression Analysis of Event Wealth Effects 
Nordea Rates of Return  
1995-2003 (2129 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Intercept 0.000470 0.000453 1.037305 0.2997 
Market 0.326757 0.065135 5.016601 0.0000*** 
EVDUM1 0.000129 0.005350 0.024119 0.9808 
EVDUM2 0.014827 0.007276 2.037751 0.0417** 
EVDUM3 0.007005 0.002507 2.793772 0.0053*** 
EVDUM4 0.001433 0.003716 0.385554 0.6999 
EVDUM5 0.002331 0.004681 0.497929 0.6186 
R-squared 0.029157 
 
Nordea Rates of Return  
1995-2003 (2129 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Intercept  5.08E-05 0.000398 0.127603 0.8985 
Comparables 0.715166 0.092695 7.715252 0.0000*** 
EVDUM1 0.000388 0.004778 0.081111 0.9354 
EVDUM2 0.011430 0.007074 1.615664 0.1063 
EVDUM3 0.006385 0.002302 2.773659 0.0056* 
EVDUM4 0.002791 0.003332 0.837887 0.4022 
EVDUM5 0.000576 0.004593 0.125376 0.9002 
R-squared 0.089471 
 
Comparbles Rates of Return  
1995-2005 (2348 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Intercept 0.000553 0.000179 3.093410 0.0020*** 
Market 0.395103 0.023844 16.57008 0.0000*** 
EVDUM1 -0.000520 0.001228 -0.423461 0.6720 
EVDUM2 0.004734 0.001012 4.679539 0.0000*** 
EVDUM3 0.001056 0.000838 1.260242 0.2077 
EVDUM4 -0.001676 0.001190 -1.408740 0.1590 
EVDUM5 0.002397 0.001730 1.385044 0.1662 
R-squared 0.225736 
  
Note: All regressions use Newey-West Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors and 
Covariances.  
Events: Nordbanken announced the planned merger with Merita on October 12, 1997, a Sunday (so the event date is 
taken as Oct. 13, observation 733), and the deal was completed on November 26, 1997 (observation 765). The 
combined Norbanken plus Merita (Nordic Baltic Holding Company) announced the attempt to acquired 
Unidanmark, and the attempt’s success, on the same day, March 6, 2000(observation 1358). Finally, the combined 
bank (MeritaNordbanken) announced its attempt to acquire Christiana Bank on September 24, 1999 (observation 
1242) and the attempt’s success on October 16, 2000 (observation 1518). The event dummies are unity for the event 
date and the following twenty days, zero otherwise.  
***,**,*  Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 2.B. Event Wealth Effects—Parameter Shifts 
 
Nordea Rates of Return  
1995-2003 (2129 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000312 0.000515 0.606808 0.5440 
Market 0.085576 0.061779 1.385196 0.1661 
Market_inter 0.468622 0.086170 5.438336 0.0000*** 
EVDUM1 0.000993 0.005086 0.195138 0.8453 
EVDUM2 0.015168 0.007005 2.165444 0.0305** 
EVDUM3 0.006588 0.005083 1.295990 0.1951 
EVDUM4 0.000890 0.005084 0.174971 0.8611 
EVDUM5 0.002820 0.005083 0.554884 0.5790 
R-squared 0.042509      
 
Nordea Rates of Return  
1995-2003 (2129 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -8.25E-05 0.000486 -0.169858 0.8651 
Comparables -0.044415 0.079587 -0.558066 0.5769 
Comparables_inter 1.214578 0.100566 12.07747 0.0000*** 
EVDUM1 0.001064 0.004795 0.221930 0.8244 
EVDUM2 0.009303 0.006612 1.406884 0.1596 
EVDUM3 0.005332 0.004795 1.112047 0.2662 
EVDUM4 0.002882 0.004793 0.601239 0.5477 
EVDUM5 -0.000370 0.004795 -0.077206 0.9385 
R-squared 0.148060      
     
Comparables Rates of Return  
1995-2003 (2348 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000536 0.000177 3.031646 0.0025 
Market 0.365195 0.022337 16.34913 0.0000*** 
Market_inter 0.055650 0.030487 1.825399 0.0681* 
EVDUM1 -0.000423 0.001838 -0.230361 0.8178 
EVDUM2 0.004771 0.002532 1.884323 0.0596* 
EVDUM3 0.001008 0.001837 0.548549 0.5834 
EVDUM4 -0.001739 0.001837 -0.946291 0.3441 
EVDUM5 0.002451 0.001837 1.334361 0.1822 
R-squared 0.226837      
 
***,**,*  Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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Table 3. Analysis of Two Comparables 
 
Danske 
1995-2005 (2810 observations)  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000642 0.000267 2.405286 0.0162 
MKT 0.376532 0.034888 10.79247 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.060890        
 
1995-2003 (2348 observations)  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000630 0.000314 2.008765 0.0447 
MKT 0.386581 0.037172 10.39990 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.062110        
 
1995-2000 (1565 observations)  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000817 0.000415 1.969652 0.0491 
MKT 0.358502 0.044696 8.020832 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.046690        
 
2001-2003 (784 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000344 0.000482 0.713489 0.4758 
MKT 0.412774 0.061280 6.735876 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.084861 
 
2004-2005 (463 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000754 0.000312 2.413243 0.0162 
MKT 0.249111 0.058444 4.262421 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.046110     
 
1995-2005 (2810 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000519 0.000254 2.042686 0.0412 
MKT 0.379696 0.034954 10.86268 0.0000*** 
EVDUM1 0.002645 0.002190 1.207698 0.2273 
EVDUM2 0.007615 0.002523 3.018085 0.0026** 
EVDUM3 -0.002457 0.005359 -0.458480 0.6466 
EVDUM4 -0.001983 0.001882 -1.054030 0.2920 
EVDUM5 0.014177 0.007966 1.779661 0.0752* 
R-squared 0.067636      
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Table 3. Analysis of Two Comparables (cont.) 
 
SHB 
1995-2005 (2810 observations)      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000541 0.000291 1.858893 0.0631 
MKT 0.599201 0.038984 15.37055 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.131539      
     
1995-2003 (2348 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000605 0.000338 1.790037 0.0736 
MKT 0.618432 0.041348 14.95675 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.136672       
 
1995-2000 (1565 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000789 0.000454 1.737592 0.0825 
MKT 0.592077 0.053429 11.08158 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.101292        
 
2001-2003 (784 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000291 0.000485 0.600343 0.5485 
MKT 0.646364 0.063046 10.25231 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.205913      
 
2004-2005 (463 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000314 0.000406 0.772699 0.4401 
MKT 0.357374 0.063523 5.625931 0.0000*** 
R-squared 0.068679        
 
1995-2005 (2810 observations) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.000464 0.000292 1.590456 0.1118 
MKT 0.599291 0.039144 15.30998 0.0000*** 
EVDUM1 0.002394 0.003170 0.755315 0.4501 
EVDUM2 0.002743 0.003938 0.696553 0.4861 
EVDUM3 0.006719 0.003046 2.205663 0.0275** 
EVDUM4 -0.001537 0.002398 -0.641021 0.5216 
EVDUM5 0.001256 0.002878 0.436432 0.6626 
R-squared 0.132894       
 
 
Note: Newey-West HAC Standard Errors and Covariances are used. 
***,**,*  Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
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Table 4. Nordea versus Major Comparables—ROE and ROA 
 
ROE    Short Average 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Average  
    (2004-1999)  
NB Danmark Group AS.cons 16.61  16.77 16.72 14.26 11.86 24.90 15.15 20.48 21.30       17.68  
NB Finland Plc.cons  14.86  7.37 14.40 6.64 21.22 18.14 21.38 15.83 24.37       16.17    
NB Norge ASA.cons  11.53  13.48 2.98 5.99 15.52 14.76 16.45 13.77 20.38 23.21     14.06  
NB Sweden AB cons  26.59    13.82 18.13 59.90 22.11 18.96 26.73 23.78 35.57     27.38  
Nordea Bank AB cons 14.11  16.26 12.99 7.90 13.23 13.94 20.33           14.11  
Average of Below  14.42  16.28 14.07 12.57 11.80 17.62 16.44 13.59 13.02 17.08     14.23  
Danske Bank   14.75  17.77 15.61 13.83 15.48 9.24 16.59 13.11 15.55 14.25     14.60  
Jyske Bank   14.67  17.56 16.32 7.70 10.24 18.91 17.28 10.06 9.30 15.05     13.60  
Sampo    10.29  14.30 11.18 13.98 1.70               10.29  
DnB Nor Bank ASA  16.03  17.98 13.57 12.42 13.55 21.68 16.96 12.62 13.26 13.86     15.10  
SEB    13.84  13.69 12.50 12.40 12.16 17.50 14.80 15.25 9.28 23.66     14.58  
SHB    16.96  16.39 15.25 15.08 17.69 20.75 16.58 16.91 17.69 18.55     17.21  
               
ROA    Short Average 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Average  
    (2004-1999) 
NB Danmark Group AS.cons 0.56  0.50 0.49 0.40 0.37 0.95 0.65 0.88 0.90       0.64  
NB Finland Plc.cons  0.96  0.74 1.65 0.32 1.02 0.98 1.06 0.74 1.09       0.95  
NB Norge ASA.cons  0.81  0.88 0.20 0.43 1.14 1.02 1.17 1.04 1.20 1.33     0.94  
NB Sweden AB cons  1.00    0.55 0.69 2.29 0.78 0.70 1.01 1.14 1.54     1.09  
Nordea Bank AB cons 0.70  0.76 0.62 0.36 0.65 0.69 1.09           0.70  
Average of Below  0.68  0.78 0.68 0.56 0.53 0.80 0.78 0.67 0.63 0.87     0.68  
Danske Bank   0.52  0.51 0.51 0.47 0.57 0.35 0.72 0.67 0.76 0.81     0.59  
Jyske Bank   0.81  1.15 1.10 0.33 0.47 0.85 0.97 0.67 0.70 1.09     0.82  
Sampo    0.59  0.88 0.63 0.77 0.09               0.59  
DnB Nor Bank ASA  0.92  0.95 0.70 0.71 0.91 1.30 0.91 0.80 0.67 0.75     0.86  
SEB    0.53  0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.36 0.85     0.56  
SHB    0.69  0.73 0.67 0.59 0.69 0.83 0.65 0.60 0.64 0.86     0.69  
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Table 5. Nordea versus All Comparables—ROE and ROA 
ROE    Short Average 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Average  
    (2004-1999) 
NB Dan. Group AS.cons 16.61  16.77 16.72 14.26 11.86 24.90 15.15 20.48 21.30       17.68  
NB Finland Plc.cons  14.86  7.37 14.40 6.64 21.22 18.14 21.38 15.83 24.37       16.17  
NB Norge ASA.cons  11.53  13.48 2.98 5.99 15.52 14.76 16.45 13.77 20.38 23.21     14.06   
NB Sweden AB cons  26.59    13.82 18.13 59.90 22.11 18.96 26.73 23.78 35.57     27.38  
Nordea Bank AB cons 14.11  16.26 12.99 7.90 13.23 13.94 20.33           14.11  
Average of Below  13.39  15.25 13.46 9.85 11.78 17.32 14.52 12.36 11.38 13.54     12.98  
Arbejdernes Landsbank 8.38  9.93 15.13 5.03 6.18 9.21 4.78 7.81 7.30 9.62     8.33  
Danske Bank   14.75  17.77 15.61 13.83 15.48 9.24 16.59 13.11 15.55 14.25     14.60  
Jyske Bank   14.67  17.56 16.32 7.70 10.24 18.91 17.28 10.06 9.30 15.05     13.60  
Spar Nord Bank  10.94  14.19 11.48 6.35 3.67 15.74 14.24 9.44 15.74 10.60     11.27  
Sydbank   15.00  17.40 16.28 11.77 13.79 18.33 12.44 11.33 9.23 9.44     13.33  
Akti Sparbank Abp  13.34  11.06 11.00 7.25 13.32 21.83 15.60 12.73 10.21 7.06     12.23  
OKO     13.91  13.59 19.32 9.98 12.92 19.87 7.78 -3.10 6.72 7.66     10.53  
OP Bank   15.04  10.18 11.22 11.35 13.57 21.80 22.13 29.14 13.27 7.65     15.59  
Sampo    10.29  14.30 11.18 13.98 1.70               10.29  
DnB Nor Bank ASA  16.03  17.98 13.57 12.42 13.55 21.68 16.96 12.62 13.26 13.86     15.10  
DnB Nor ASA Cons   12.29    7.16 8.94 15.87 16.80 12.69 5.53         11.17  
Gjensidige NOR ASA  11.40      9.25 13.55               11.40  
Sparbanken Midt-Norge 11.34  18.00 10.11 0.33 9.92 12.12 17.57 14.93 19.04 17.72     13.30  
SEB    13.84  13.69 12.50 12.40 12.16 17.50 14.80 15.25 9.28 23.66     14.58  
SHB    16.96  16.39 15.25 15.08 17.69 20.75 16.58 16.91 17.69 18.55     17.21  
Swedbank   16.13  21.52 15.83 11.90 14.92 18.72 13.87 17.29 1.33 20.88     15.14  
 
ROA    Short Average 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 Average  
    (2004-1999) 
NB Danmark Group AS.cons 0.56  0.50 0.49 0.40 0.37 0.95 0.65 0.88 0.90       0.64  
NB Finland Plc.cons  0.96  0.74 1.65 0.32 1.02 0.98 1.06 0.74 1.09       0.95  
NB Norge ASA.cons  0.81  0.88 0.20 0.43 1.14 1.02 1.17 1.04 1.20 1.33     0.94  
NB Sweden AB cons  1.00    0.55 0.69 2.29 0.78 0.70 1.01 1.14 1.54     1.09  
Nordea Bank AB cons 0.70  0.76 0.62 0.36 0.65 0.69 1.09           0.70  
Average of Below  0.76  0.85 0.79 0.54 0.66 0.97 0.79 0.68 0.65 0.75     0.73  
Arbejdernes Landsbank 0.93  1.09 1.81 0.61 0.70 0.91 0.47 0.76 0.67 0.93     0.88 
Danske Bank   0.52  0.51 0.51 0.47 0.57 0.35 0.72 0.67 0.76 0.81     0.59  
Jyske Bank   0.81  1.15 1.10 0.33 0.47 0.85 0.97 0.67 0.70 1.09     0.82  
Spar Nord Bank  0.65  0.86 0.73 0.37 0.20 0.91 0.87 0.59 1.11 0.76     0.71  
Sydbank   0.80  0.98 0.92 0.62 0.69 0.95 0.62 0.64 0.52 0.59     0.72  
Akti Sparbank Abp  0.66  0.54 0.58 0.36 0.66 1.11 0.71 0.59 0.62 0.43     0.62  
OKO     0.68  0.63 0.86 0.50 0.63 1.08 0.37 -0.17 0.39 0.39     0.52  
OP Bank   1.29  1.00 1.07 1.08 1.22 1.87 1.48 1.64 0.58 0.33     1.14  
Sampo    0.59  0.88 0.63 0.77 0.09               0.59  
DnB Nor Bank ASA  0.92  0.95 0.70 0.71 0.91 1.30 0.91 0.80 0.67 0.75     0.86  
DnB Nor ASA Cons  0.84    0.43 0.61 1.14 1.17 0.88 0.36         0.76  
Gjensidige NOR ASA  0.75      0.59 0.91               0.75  
Sparbanken Midt-Norge 0.74  1.11 0.60 0.02 0.64 0.81 1.26 1.08 1.39 1.22     0.90  
SEB    0.53  0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.36 0.85     0.56  
SHB    0.69  0.73 0.67 0.59 0.69 0.83 0.65 0.60 0.64 0.86     0.69  
Swedbank   0.70  0.96 0.72 0.53 0.65 0.78 0.57 0.64 0.05 0.77     0.63  
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Table 6.A. Nordea Holding Company versus Comparables 
 
 
A. Longer Time Period 
ROE   ROA 
 
 Nordea     14.11 %   0.70 
 Large Comparables   14.23    0.68 
 Nordea - comparables       -0.12   0.02 
 
 Nordea     14.11    0.70 
 All Comparables    12.98    0.73 
 Nordea - comparables     1.13   -0.03 
 
 
B. Shorter Time Period 
       ROE   ROA 
 
 Nordea     14.11 %    0.70 
 Large Comparables   14.42     0.68 
 Nordea - comparables    -0.31    0.02 
 
 Nordea     14.11     0.70 
 All Comparables    13.39     0.76 
 Nordea - comparables     0.72    -0.06 
 
 
Note: In the comparisons in Tables 6.A and 6.B, the larger number is in boldface. The Nordea 
Holding Company is the Nordea institutions as a whole, whatever the actual name was in a 
particular period. The comparables are holding companies, and are thus not strictly comparable 
to the Nordea banks in Table 7.B.  
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Table 6.B. Nordea Banks versus Comparables 
       ROE   ROA 
Denmark 
Longer:  
Nordea    17.68 %   0.64 
Comparables   12.23    0.75 
Nordea - comparables   5.45   -0.11 
Shorter:  
Nordea    16.61    0.56 
Comparables   12.75    0.74    
Nordea - comparables   3.86   -0.18 
 
Finland 
 Longer:  
Nordea:    16.17    0.95 
Comparables    12.16    0.72 
Nordea - comparables   4.01    0.23 
 Shorter: 
Nordea    14.86    0.96 
Comparables    13.15    0.80 
Nordea - comparables   1.71    0.16 
 
Norway 
 Longer: 
Nordea    14.06    0.94 
Comparables    12.74    0.82 
Nordea - comparables   1.32    0.12 
Shorter:   
Nordea    11.53    0.81     
Comparables    12.77    0.81 
Nordea - comparables  -1.24   0.00 
 
Sweden 
Longer: 
Nordea    27.38 (22.73) 1.09 (0.82) 
Comparables    15.64   0.63 
Nordea - comparables 11.74 (7.09) 0.46 (0.19) 
Shorter: 
Nordea    26.59 (18.26)  1.00 (0.68) 
Comparables   15.64   0.64 
Nordea - comparables 10.95 (2.62) 0.36 (0.04) 
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Table 7. Cost/Income Ratios: Nordea and Large Comparables 
Cost/Income  Short Average 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997  1996 Average 
  (2004-2000) 
NB Danmark Group AS.cons 0.64  0.63 0.61 0.65 0.61 0.68 0.72 0.71 0.69    0.66 
NB Finland Plc.cons  0.61  0.55 0.64 0.72 0.63 0.53 0.62 0.60 0.59    0.61 
NB Norge ASA.cons  0.59  0.58 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.63 0.65   0.64  0.60 
NB Sweden AB cons  0.64    0.67 0.71 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.57 0.54   0.47  0.59 
NB AB cons  0.62  0.59 0.64 0.68 0.61 0.56 0.57        0.61 
Average of Below  0.61  0.57 0.59 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.64   0.64  0.64 
Danske Bank  0.61  0.55 0.56 0.60 0.61 0.72 0.67 0.64 0.63   0.55  0.62 
Sampo  0.73  0.68 0.75 0.72 0.75            0.73 
DnB Nor Bank ASA  0.58  0.57 0.59 0.61 0.59 0.56 0.64 0.66 0.71   0.73  0.63 
SEB  0.72  0.63 0.65 0.76 0.83 0.76 0.85 0.82 0.70   0.58  0.73 
SHB  0.45  0.41 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.54 0.50   0.42  0.47 
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Table 8. Effects of General Insurance on Nordea’s Accounting Profitability a, b 
 
 
Nordea Holding Co. 2000  2001   2002 
Income before Tax  2,424.00   1,928.00   1,292.00  
Tax      675.74     363.32      443.29 
Income after Tax  1,748.26  1,564.68      848.71 
Total Equity  11,152.00   11,819.00   11,897.00  
   
Nordea’s General Insurance 2000  2001   2002 
Income before Tax  53.00   (18.00)  (122.00) 
Total Equity  662.50   437.00   576.76  
 
Holding Co. less Insurance 2000  2001   2002 
Income before Tax  2,371.00 27  1,946.00   1,414.00  
Tax      675.74     363.32      443.29 
Income after Tax  1,695.27 28  1,582.68       970.71  
Total Equity  10,489.50   11,382.00   11,320.24  
 
    
     
ROE 
   2000  2001   2002 
Nordea Holding Co.  15.68% 29  13.24%  7.13% 
Holding Co. less Insurance 16.16% 30  13.91%  8.58% 
 
 
a Note: In 2002, Nordea Bank AB, the Nordea holding company, sold its General Insurance 
operations.  
 
The calculations in these tables are designed to show the order of magnitude of the effects of the 
General Insurance operation on Nordea's ROE. Because the income and equity figures in this 
table have not been adjusted in the same way as those used to calculate ROE in Tables 4 and 5, 
the ROE estimates for the Nordea holding company in this table do not match those in Tables 4 
and 5.  
 
There are many plausible ways of allocating a share of total taxes to the General Insurance 
operations. For simplicity, the total taxes used in calculations are the same for the holding 
company and the holding company less insurance. This overstates taxes for the latter in 2000, 
and understates them in 2001 and 2002, as opposed to most ways of allocating taxes.  
 
b Because of rounding, sub-totals may not add to totals.  
                                                 
27 2,371.00 = 2,424.00 - 53.00. 
28 1,695.27 = 2,371.00 - 675.74. 
29 1,748.26 = 2,424.00 - 675.74. (1,748.26 / 11,152.00) x 100 = 15.67665%.  
30 (1,695.27 / 10,489.50) x 100 = 16.16159%. 
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Figure 1.A. Relative Wealth Indices: 1995 through 2003 
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Figure 1. B. Relative Wealth Indices: 1995 through 2005 
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Notes: On day 220, both indices are 100, or in natural logrithyms are 4.6051702. 
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Figure 2—Nordea Descriptive Statistics, 1995-2003 
0
100
200
300
400
500
-0.10 -0.05 -0.00 0.05 0.10
Series: DLNORDEA
Sample 1 2350
Observations 2130
Mean       0.000748
Median   0.000000
Maximum  0.121423
Minimum -0.122821
Std. Dev.   0.023632
Skewness   0.103376
Kurtosis   5.748829
Jarque-Bera  674.3941
Probability  0.000000
 
 
 
Figure 3—Comparables Descriptive Statistics, 1995-2003 
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Figure 4—Nordea Descriptive Statistics, 2001-2003 
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Figure 5—Comparables Descriptive Statistics, 2001-2003 
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Figure 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns, First Event: 
Nordbanken (Sweden) and Merita (Finland) Announce Negotations  
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Figure 7. Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Second Event: 
Nordbanken and Merita Meger Acceplted 
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Figure 8. Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Third Event: 
Baltic Holding Company Announces Both Its Intention and Success 
in Acquiring Unidanmark 
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Figure 9. Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Fourth Event: 
Nordea Announces Intention to Acquire Christiania (Norway) 
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Figure 10. Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Fifth Event: 
Nordea Announces Success in Acquiring Christiania (Norway) 
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